The Structural Role of the Bill of Rights by Wilkins, Richard G.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 6 | Issue 3 Article 4
9-1-1992
The Structural Role of the Bill of Rights
Richard G. Wilkins
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard G. Wilkins, The Structural Role of the Bill of Rights, 6 BYU J. Pub. L. 525 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol6/iss3/4
The Structural Role of the Bill of Rights 
Richard G. Wilkins* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two months ago, when I was asked to make a presentation 
on the history, structure and derivation of the Bill of Rights, I 
was quite hesitant-and for a very good reason. True, I teach 
constitutional law. But since when did constitutional 
law-which focuses on the occasionally literate meanderings of 
the Supreme Court-have anything to do with the history, 
structure or derivation of the Bill of Rights? I therefore invoked 
ignorance and begged to be passed over. However, Ted Lewis/ 
who called me repeatedly on the issue, was not to be dissuaded. 
Mter several discussions, I caved in and agreed to participate. 
And, when pressed for a topic, I responded with a title that I 
thought was grandiloquent enough to be academically 
impressive while still being vague enough to permit almost 
limitless fudging. "I will speak on the structural role of the Bill 
of Rights," I said. 
The structural role of the Bill of Rights? Ted was kind 
enough not to snigger, and he dutifully transcribed the title 
and passed it on to those who prepared today's agenda. 
Doubtless many of you in the audience are here-not merely to 
obtain needed Continuing Legal Education credit in a relatively 
painless fashion-but also to see just how Wilkins could press 
the Bill of Rights into a structural mold. 
Generally, when one talks of "structure" in the 
constitutional law context, the discussion centers around the 
governmental plan erected by the first three Articles of the 
Constitution: a tripartite federal government with separated 
and specifically limited powers operating in tandem (and often 
in tension) with the states. By contrast, the Bill of Rights is not 
generally thought of as a "structural" component, but rather as 
* 
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a guarantor of especially important freedoms. Thus, in 
conventional terminology, the Bill of Rights is not "structural" 
but rather is designed to keep government (however structured) 
off the backs of the people. 
But, despite the general accuracy of the foregoing, I believe 
that the Bill of Rights has played-and continues to 
play-several important structural roles. Perhaps not roles 
perfectly consistent with the classic definition of "structure" 
just noted, but structural nevertheless. 
As an initial matter, the Bill of Rights played a vital 
structural role in securing the passage of the Constitution.2 It 
is quite possible that we simply would not have had the 
Constitution of 1787 without a wrenching political agreement 
to amend that document to include the Bill of Rights. That 
political debate focused on structure, and resulted in the 
insertion of an explicitly structural component into the Bill of 
Rights-the Tenth Amendment. 
Second, the Bill of Rights has played a significant-and 
somewhat ironic-role in restructuring American federalism 
over the past century.3 The Bill of Rights, originally intended 
to protect the individual against federal power and secure the 
reserved sovereignty of the states, has instead become a potent 
means of subjecting the states to federal control. In a very real 
sense, the Antifederalist "victory" embodied in the Bill of 
Rights has become the Antifederalists' ultimate defeat. 
Third, and finally, the Bill of Rights is now playing a 
decisive role in restructuring modern society by redefining the 
contemporary limits of community power.4 The specific 
provisions of the Bill of Rights-originally designed to regulate 
the interaction of the government with the individual-have 
been expanded to create a generalized, constitutional doctrine 
of "privacy" or "autonomy" that directs (and sometimes 
controls) the purely personal interaction of private individuals. 
All three of these structural roles-which for the sake of 
discussion I will label the "historical," the "ironical," and the 
"sociological"-merit some attention during our celebration of 
the two-hundredth anniversary of the Bill of Rights. The 
historical role of the Bill of Rights is instructive, not only for its 
own sake, but for whatever light it might shed on the future 
2. See infra part II. 
3. See infra part Ill. 
4. See infra part IV. 
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interpretation of the document. The ironical use of the Bill of 
Rights to submerge state sovereignty raises continuing 
questions about the proper role of federalism in American life. 
The impact of modern "rights" rhetoric on the sociology of the 
American community, furthermore, raises issues that must be 
addressed-not only by thoughtful lawyers and judges-but by 
the best minds of every profession. 
With this background, and with the caveat that my 
ruminations on these topics are quite preliminary, I will 
attempt a few personal observations on the various structural 
roles of the Bill of Rights. First, I will address the role of the 
Bill of Rights in structuring the Constitution of 1787. My 
comments on this historical role are somewhat more detailed 
than those on the ironical or sociological roles-in part because 
Ted asked me to structure my remarks that way and in part 
because the history of the Bill of Rights is a topic on which 
most lawyers have little or no passing knowledge. 
II. STRUCTURING THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: THE ROLE OF 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS 
The notion that certain rights were "fundamental" or 
"inalienable" was well-established in America by 1787.5 The 
Magna Carta of 1215 and the English Bill of Rights of 1689 
had established various "rights of Englishmen," including the 
right to a trial by a jury of one's peers, a prohibition on 
standing armies in time of peace, and a limited form of freedom 
of speech. 6 As Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry noted in 
their recent history of the American Constitution, "In theory, if 
not in practice, British and colonial governments-as well as 
the infant state governments-lacked power to deprive citizens 
of certain rights. Such rights belonged inherently to all citizens, 
even in the absence of written protections."7 
This theory of rights was rooted firmly in natural law. The 
Declaration of Independence and state declarations of rights, 
drafted immediately following the Revolution, were grounded 
upon natural law notions of "inalienable" and "self-evident" 
rights. 8 The 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, for 
fi. DANIEL A. FARRER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF nm AMERICAN 
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example, provided: "That all men are born equally free and 
independent, and have certain natural, inherent and 
inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."9 
The influential Virginia Declaration of Rights, drafted by 
George Mason, echoed these natural law themes, and in 
addition, evidenced a pronounced distrust and fear of 
governmental power. Mason wrote that "all power is vested in, 
and consequently derived from, the People," who retain an 
"unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, alter, or 
abolish" governments they establish. 10 
To preserve the independence of the states as well as the 
natural rights of mankind, the drafters of the Articles of 
Confederation purposely created a weak national government 
that lacked such essential powers as the ability to regulate 
commerce and levy taxes. 11 Such a governmental structure 
promoted individual liberty by denying government the power 
to intrude upon either the state or the individual. But that 
liberty came at a high cost. In denying the federal government 
the power to intrude, the Articles of Confederation seemingly 
denied the federal government the power to exist. 12 
By 1787, the new nation was a veritable shamble. Lacking 
the power to tax, the continental congress was unable to pay 
the outstanding debts from the Revolutionary War or maintain 
an effective army. 13 Unable to regulate commerce, the federal 
government stood helpless as the states engaged in internecine 
commercial warfare. 14 As a result, Noah Webster described 
the new nation as a "pretended union" limping its way toward 
disaster. 15 
To prevent that disaster, the Constitutional Convention 
convened in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787. The high 
purpose of that convention-ostensibly called to amend the 
Articles of Confederation-was, instead, to create an entirely 
new form of government. 16 Opposition to this enterprise, 
8. !d. at 220 (quoting THE 1776 PENNSYLVANIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 
(1976)). 
10. Irl. at 221. 
11. Srr id. at 24-25. 
12. THE STATES RI<lHTS DEBATE 15 (Alpheus T. Mason cd., 2d ed. 1972). 
l:i. FAHRER & SHERRY, supra note fi, at 24. 
14. !d. at 2fi. 
1fi. Flaws in the First Charter, LIFE, Sept. 1987, at 22, 22. 
16. See ROBERT A. RUTLAND, ORDEAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1966) ("The 
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which envisioned a relatively strong central government, was 
almost immediate. Debate over the new Constitution quickly 
polarized into two competing political camps: the Federalists 
(who supported adoption of the new Constitution) and the 
Antifederalists (who opposed the new governmental 
structure). 17 
The Antifederalist movement was animated by the two 
basic concerns that had spawned the Articles of Confederation: 
states' rights and personal liberties. 18 Their overriding 
concern, however, was almost certainly the former and not the 
latter. 19 Indeed, most historians agree that Antifederalist 
worries regarding the absence of a Bill of Rights were 
secondary to their concerns regarding states' rights. 20 
Nevertheless, early in the ratification struggle Antifederalist 
leaders learned that citizens were more easily aroused by 
appeals for personal liberty than with talk of federalism and 
states' rights. 21 Thus, the Antifederalists quickly focused upon 
the lack of a Bill of Rights as a rallying call to mobilize public 
opinion in support of their movement. 
Using the Bill of Rights issue to oppose the new 
Constitution proved attractive on several grounds. For one 
thing, Antifederalist leaders had little trouble joining states' 
rights concerns with arguments in favor of a Bill of Rights. The 
natural law tendencies of the times, coupled with the fact that 
virtually every state had adopted declarations protective of 
these natural rights, made state and individual rights 
arguments often appear as intertwining, indivisible themes.22 
So much so, that during the ratification process it was often 
difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the two basic 
Antifederalist motives. 23 For example, George Mason's classic 
"Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed by the 
Convention" raised the alarm that, by subjecting the states to 
federal control, the new constitution gravely endangered 
personal liberty. Why? Because in the federal Constitution, 
moving spirits behind the Convention had no further use for the Articles of 
Confederation, but it would have been imprudent to bare this attitude publicly."). 
17. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 175-76. 
18. THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 5. 
19. Jd. at 98. 
20. ld. at 104 n.178. 
21. RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 218. 
22. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 219-21. 
23. THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 98. 
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"There is no Declaration of Rights; and the Laws of the general 
Government being paramount to the Laws & Constitutions of 
the several States, the Declarations of Rights in the separate 
States are no Security."24 
But, the most potent advantage the Bill of Rights issue 
afforded the Antifederalists was not the palatable buffer it 
provided for discourses on states rights. Rather, the absence of 
a Bill of Rights was genuinely troubling to a recently liberated 
populace that believed in natural, inalienable rights. 25 Brutus, 
a New York Antifederalist essayist publishing in New York in 
November of 1787, wrote, "in forming a government on its true 
principles, the foundation should be laid . . . by expressly 
reserving to the people such of their essential natural rights, as 
are not necessary to be parted with.26 Brutus argued that the 
need to expressly reserve "essential natural rights" was 
"confirmed by universal experience" which had "induced the 
people in all countries, where any sense of freedom remained, 
to fix barriers against the encroachments of their rulers."27 
Noting that every state in the fledgling Union contained bills or 
declarations of rights, Brutus concluded that "It is therefore the 
more astonishing, that this grand security, to the rights of the 
people, is not to be found in this [federal] constitution."28 
Federalist supporters responded to these criticisms in a 
number of ways. States' rights arguments were deflected by 
emphasizing that the federal govemment possessed only 
specific, enumerated powers. Madison wrote, in The Federalist 
No. 45, that "[tlhe powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. 
Those which are to remain in the State govemments are 
numerous and indefinite."29 As a result, Madison asserted 
that "[tlhe State governments will have the advantage of the 
federal government.":30 
24. Letter of Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed hy the 
Convention from George Mason, Virginia Assemplyman, Constitutional Convention, 
to George Washington, President of the United States (17R7), rPprinted in THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 34R (JOliN P. 
KAMINSKI ET AL. eds., 19R1) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
25. FAHmJR & SHERRY, »upra note fi, at 222-23. 
26. Id. at 22:1. 
27. !d. at 22:1-24. 
2R. Id. at 224. 
29. THE F@EHAL!ST No. 4fi, at :12H (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 
1961). 
30. Id. at :126. 
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On the issue of individual liberty, the Federalists 
consistently maintained that the "Constitution's institutional 
checks provided more effective security" for individual rights 
than a Bill of Rights. 31 They submitted that a federal 
government with enumerated powers, operating in competition 
with state governments, eliminated the need for a bill of 
rights. 32 Thus, in Federalist No. 84, Hamilton asserted that, 
because "bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between 
kings and their subjects," Americans "have no need of 
particular reservations" of rights since "in strictness the people 
surrender nothing" and "retain every thing."33 And, m 
Federalist No. 28, Hamilton invoked federal/state rivalry to 
argue that: 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general 
government will at all times stand ready to check the 
usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the 
same disposition towards the general government. The people, 
by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make 
it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can 
make use of the other as the instrument of redress.34 
Federalists, finally, asserted that any enumeration of 
protected rights would be positively dangerous for at least two 
reasons. First, the enumeration might unwittingly expand the 
power of the federal government. In Hamilton's words, a bill of 
rights containing "various exceptions to powers not granted" 
might "afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were 
granted."35 A provision protecting the press, for example, 
could "afford[] a clear implication that a power to prescribe the 
proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in 
the national government."36 
The second danger lurking behind a bill of rights in 
Federalist eyes was the possibility that an enumeration would 
improperly cabin the natural rights of man. James Iredell 
cautioned that: 
31. THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 85. 
32. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 224; THE STATES RIGHTS DEI:IATE, 
supra note 12, at 187. 
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 29, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton). 
34. Id. No. 28, at 225. 
:cl5. Id. No. 84, at 5:clfi. 
36. Id. 
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[l]t would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a 
number of rights which are not intended to be given up; 
because it would be implying, in the strongest manner, that 
every right not included in the exception might be impaired 
by the government without usurpation; and it would be 
impossible to enumerate every one. Let any one make what 
collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will 
immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not 
contained in it."37 
With the lines thus drawn between the Federalists and the 
Antifederalists, the debate regarding a Bill of Rights raged 
throughout the ratification period. The debate, indeed, began 
even before the Constitutional Convention had completed its 
work. On August 20, 1787, Charles Pinckney submitted a 
proposal safeguarding "liberty of the Press," prohibiting the use 
of religious tests, and limiting the maintenance of troops in 
times of peace.38 Pinckney's proposal was rejected.39 Two 
more attempts to add a Bill of Rights by George Mason and 
Elbridge Gerry were similarly rejected. 40 On September 16, 
1787-the day before the Constitutional Convention finished its 
labors-Edmund Randolph, objecting to what he called '"the 
indefinite and dangerous power given by the Constitution to 
Congress,' proposed to amend the ratification procedure" by 
granting state ratifying conventions the power to propose 
amendments "'which should be submitted to and finally decided 
on by another General Convention."'41 This motion, like the 
others, failed. 42 As a result, Randolph, Elbridge Gerry, and 
George Mason refused to sign the Constitution when it was 
adopted by the Convention the very next day. 43 
Having lost the Bill of Rights battle in the constitutional 
convention, the Antifederalists carried the fight to the 
Continental Congress. In Congress, Richard Henry Lee led the 
Antifederalist charge. He argued that Congress should amend 
::17. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 224 (quoting North Carolina Ratifying 
Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 167 (Jonathan 
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the Constitution before sending it to the respective states for 
ratification. 44 Lee was of the opinion that amendments should 
contain a Bill of Rights to "'plainly and strongly' provide 
bulwarks for the states against the national government, 
particularly the south[ern] states .... "45 Congress, however, 
heeded the careful arguments of James Madison that Congress 
could not amend the new Constitution without making it an 
Act of Congress (that would have to be ratified by all thirteen 
state legislatures), rather than an Act of the Convention (which 
could be ratified by the action of nine state ratifying 
conventions).46 Evidently fearful that the new Constitution 
would not be ratified if it went before the various legislatures, 
the Continental Congress rejected the amendment proposal and 
sent the Constitution on to the state ratifying conventionsY 
Now thwarted in the convention and Congress, the 
Antifederalists renewed their efforts before the state 
conventions. All involved knew that the greatest battles over 
the Constitution were yet to be fought. Moreover, it was 
apparent that the battle for "the Constitution would be won or 
lost in a few large states."48 And, it was in those few states 
that the debate over the Bill of Rights played a pivotal role. 
Pennsylvania was the first major state to ratify. That state 
ratified the Constitution only twenty hours after the 
Continental Congress had transferred the document to the 
states for their consideration.49 Pennsylvania, however, was 
not much of a test for the Constitution, nor the Federalist 
party. Realizing that momentum was on their side, 
Pennsylvania Federalists raced the Constitution through the 
convention before the opposition had a chance to get 
organized-even going so far as to place several Antifederalist 
members under house arrest so that a quorum of members 
could be obtained for ratification.50 
In Massachusetts, Virginia and New York, ratification was 
not as easily attained. Antifederalists in those states were well 
44. Congressional Debates of the Confederation Congress and the Constitution 
(Sept. 26-28 1787), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 24, at 238. 
45. RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 219. 
46. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Sept. 30 1787), in 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, t<upra note 24, at 276. 
47. See id. 
48. RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 50. 
49. !d. at 20-21. 
50. !d. at 20. 
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organized and had gained substantial popular support. To head 
off almost certain defeat in these large key states, the 
Federalists retreated on the amendment issue. Realizing that 
conditional amendments imposed by state conventions would be 
fatal to the cause, Federalists in Massachusetts proposed that 
the state convention ratify the Constitution, but attach 
recommended amendments to be considered by Congress 
following ratification.51 
This proposal was backed by the promises of several 
prominent Federalists (including James Madison in Virginia) to 
seek the recommended amendments immediately following 
ratification.52 The Massachusetts' compromise caught on, and 
was followed in eight states, including Virginia and New 
York.53 These states unconditionally ratified the Constitution, 
but attached long and diverse "wish lists" demanding 
amendments to the document.54 Although the details of the 
various "wish lists" differed, they were unanimous on one 
point: "[a]ll eight ... included among their recommendations 
some version of what later become the Tenth Amendment."55 
With eventual ratification by eleven of the thirteen states, 
including the large key states, the Constitution was adopted. 
Nevertheless, the framer's work was not finished. The 
Massachusetts' compromise had procured the passage of the 
Constitution, but ratification was accompanied by clamorous 
demands for important amendments.56 While these demands 
technically could go unheeded as ratification had not been 
conditional upon congressional acquiescence in the proposed 
amendments, the states still had a formidable weapon at their 
disposal. "On May 5, 1789, Virginia submitted to Congress an 
application for the calling of a second constitutional convention. 
New York followed suit the next day."57 
The proposal for a second constitutional convention caused 
great alarm among Federalist forces. Federalist leaders 
recognized that a second convention probably would not achieve 
the same results as the first. Unlike the first, a second 
51. THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 92. 
52. Id. 
53. !d. at 92-93. 
54. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 225. 
55. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 569 
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
56. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 226. 
57. !d. at 226. 
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convention would not enjoy a cloak of secrecy.58 The jealousies 
of politicians and states would be interjected into the 
convention discussions as newspapers published accounts of the 
proceedings.59 Moreover, a second convention was likely to 
bring about "precipitous changes" in the structure of the new 
government proposed by the Constitution. 60 As James 
Madison wrote Thomas Jefferson following New York's 
ratification of the Constitution: "'The great danger in the 
present crisis is that if another Convention should be soon 
assembled, it would terminate in discord . . . or in alterations 
of the federal system which would throw back essential powers 
into the State Legislatures."'61 
"Realizing that adoption of a bill of rights might be the 
only way to [avoid a second constitutional convention], James 
Madison fulfill[ed] his ... promise to shepherd a Bill of Rights 
through the new Congress."62 In large part, Madison's 
willingness to sponsor amendments to the Constitution may 
have stemmed from his fear that a Bill of Rights could alter the 
existing structural provisions of the new Constitution. He was 
concerned that-if the Antifederalists took the lead-they 
would promote amendments that would damage national 
authority. 63 
On May 4, 1789, Madison announced to Congress that "he 
intended to bring amendments to the Constitution before the 
House in late May" and on June 8, 1789, he presented his 
amendments to the House of Representatives.64 Madison's 
proposed amendments-initially drafted as amendments to the 
existing seven articles of the Constitution-embodied many of 
the individual liberties guaranteed in state bills of rights, as 
well as general principles garnered from the "wish lists" of the 
various state ratification conventions. 65 
The proposed amendments included many provisions that 
eventually found their way into the Bill of Rights, such as 
clauses providing for freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the 
fiR. RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 19. 
fi9. THE STATE RmHTs DEBATE, supra note 12, at 95. 
60. ld. at 96. 
61. RUTLAND, supra note 16, at 266. 
62. FAHBEH & SHEHHY, supra note 5, at 226. 
63. THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 96. 
64. FARBER & SHERHY, supra note 5, at 226. 
65. RICIIAHD B. BEHNSTEIN, AHE WE TO BE A NATION?, 264 (19R7); ROREHT A. 
RUTLAND, THE BIHTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 194 (1955). 
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right to keep and bear arms, and the right to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 66 In addition, the 
proposed amendments prohibited deprivation of life, liberty and 
property without due process of law, the taking of property 
without just compensation and cruel and unusual 
punishment. 67 Beyond these now-well-known provisions, 
Madison proposed amendments regulating the size of the 
House of Representatives and exempting a person "religiously 
scrupulous of bearing arms" from compelled military service.68 
Two of Madison's proposals directly addressed structural 
concerns. His eighth proposed amendment would have added a 
new article to the Constitution, just before the present Article 
VII, containing two sections.69 The first section would provide 
for strict separation of federal powers, by mandating that "[ t]he 
powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the 
departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that 
the Legislative Department shall never exercise powers vested 
in the Executive or Judicial," and so on for each branch. 70 The 
second section-which in slightly altered form eventually 
became the Tenth Amendment-provided that "The powers not 
delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively."71 
Madison's second structural proposal addressed both 
individual rights and governmental structure. 72 In his fourth 
proposed amendment, Madison provided against federal 
infringement of religious liberty, free expression and jury trial 
in criminal cases. 73 In his fifth proposed amendment, however, 
Madison extended these prohibitions to the states with the 
following language: "No State shall violate the equal rights of 
conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in 
criminal cases."74 This proposal, of course, was structural in 
the same sense that the prohibitions on state power in article I, 
section 10 are structural: it constituted a direct federal 
constriction of the states' otherwise plenary power. 75 
66. FARBJ<;R & SHERRY, supra note f), at 228-29. 
67. !d. at 228. 
68. !d. 
69. !d. at 229. 
70. !d. 
71. !d. 
72. See id. at 229-.'30. 
73. !d. at 228. 
74. ld. at 228 (emphasis added). 
75. Compare id. at 228 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (noting the similarities 
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Madison's proposals were debated thoroughly on the floor 
of the House, although the Representatives did not-in 
complete honesty-attach much importance to the matter. 
Members repeatedly complained that there was "much other 
and more important business requiring attention."76 On 
August 13, 1789, as Madison struggled to focus the House's 
attention on the amendments, John Vining of Delaware noted 
that he had the right to call for consideration of a bill 
"'establishing a Land Office for the disposal of the vacant lands 
in the Westem Territory."'77 Vining nevertheless yielded the 
floor to Madison for discussion of the amendments, but not 
without noting that the Vining bill had priority "'in point of 
time"' and that "'in point of importance, every candid mind 
would acknowledge its preference."'78 
Following House debate, it was decided that the 
amendments would be appended to the end of the Constitution 
rather than interlineated into the existing articles of the 
document. 79 Finally, on August 24, 1789, a House resolution 
containing seventeen articles of amendment was sent to the 
Senate for consideration.80 
Little is known regarding Senate deliberations, due to the 
fact that the Senate sat in closed session until 1794.81 The 
Senate, however, rejected Madison's proposal that conscientious 
objectors be excused from military service. The Senate also 
rejected several of Madison's structural proposals, including the 
article prohibiting the states from violating rights of 
conscience, freedom of the press and trial by jury and the 
section calling for strict separation of powers in the national 
government. 82 
As reformulated by the Senate, twelve amendments were 
sent to the states for ratification.83 The first amendment dealt 
with congressional apportionment.84 The second provided that 
"No law varying the compensation for the services of the 
between the structural prohibitions on state power). 
76. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 232. 
77. !d. 
78. !d. 
79. !d. at 240. 
80. BERNS'TEIN, supra note 65, at 267. 
81. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 241. 
82. !d. at 242. 
83. BERNS'TEIN, supra note 65, at 267. 
84. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note fi, at 243. 
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Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an 
election of Representatives shall have intervened."85 These 
first two amendments were never ratified.86 The last ten 
amendments-now known as the Bill of Rights-became 
effective when Virginia became the eleventh state to ratify on 
December 15, 1791.87 
The foregoing history establishes, I think, that the Bill of 
Rights-viewed in historical perspective-has played a vital 
structural role in at least two ways. First, it was structural 
arguments by both the proponents and opponents of the 
Constitution that brought forth the Bill of Rights. 
Second, and more importantly, however, the Bill of Rights 
itself reflects important structural compromises struck by the 
Federalists and Antifederalists. Madison's proposal to restrict 
the power of the states by limiting state regulation of 
conscience, free speech and jury trial was rejected.88 The 
amendments that were adopted, moreover, expressly fettered 
the federal government while preserving the separate role of 
the states.89 George Mason and other Antifederalists had 
repeatedly expressed fears that the new federal government 
was so powerful that it would eventually subsumed the 
states.90 The Tenth Amendment, which preserves to the states 
all rights "not delegated to the United States," was plainly 
designed to eliminate these fears. 91 
History, therefore, demonstrates the important structural 
role of the Bill of Rights played in securing the adoption of the 
Constitution. Perhaps more important for present purposes, 
however, is the role the Bill of Rights has played during the 
past one-hundred years-and continues to play today-in 




88. BERNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 264; FARBER & SHERRY, supra note .~, at 
242. 
89. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 5, at 2:~0. 
90. THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 6. 
91. Compare JAMES WILSON, SPEECH AT A PUBLIC MEETINn IN PHILADELPHIA 
(Oct. 6 1787), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 24, at ::lH9 and 
U.S. CONST. amend. X (addressing Antifederalist fears that the new government 
would subsume the states). 
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III. THE IRONICAL ROLE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN 
RESTRUCTURING AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
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I would now like to turn attention to the second structural 
role played by the Bill of Rights: that is, the ironic role it has 
played in restructuring American federalism. That irony results 
from the fact that the Bill of Rights-"a notable Antifederalist 
victory in 1790-is now appraised as a defeat for state 
rights."92 The advocates of states' rights believed that a Bill of 
Rights was necessary to protect the sovereign states from 
undue intrusion by the federal government.93 The very 
protections the Antifederalists lobbied for, however, have been 
an engine for further subjugation of state power. 
This structural shift in power between the federal and 
state government has resulted from two factors. The first is the 
incorporation doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment, by 
which the Supreme Court has applied the most important 
elements of the first eight amendments to the states. The 
second has been the past inability and current unwillingness of 
the Supreme Court to construct coherent doctrine under the 
Tenth Amendment. The net effect of these two factors has been 
a dramatic redrawing of the federal structure of the nation. 
History and the writings of the Framers established 
beyond reasonable dispute that they did not anticipate that the 
Bill of Rights would apply to the states. Indeed, Madison's 
proposal to restrict state authority in the areas of conscience, 
free speech and jury trials was plainly rejected. 94 In Barron v. 
Mayor of Baltimore,95 the original Justice Marshall reflected 
this original understanding of the Bill of Rights when he wrote: 
"Had the framers of the Amendments intended them to be 
limitations on the powers of the state governments," he wrote, 
"they would have . . . expressed that intention . . . in plain 
and intelligible language."96 
From 1833, when Barron was decided, to the turn of the 
century the Court so frequently reaffirmed Justice Marshall's 
opinion that the doctrine became "elementary."97 Nonetheless, 
92. THE STATE RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 6. 
93. ld. at Rl. 
94. BERNb'TEIN, supra note 65, at 264. 
95. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
96. ld. at 250. 
97. Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 
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as one legal scholar in 1926 put it, "[i]nspite of th[e] emphatic 
language [reaffirming the doctrine], counsel for defendants, 
whether by reason of ignorance, incorrigible optimism, or desire 
for delay, continued to urge (chiefly in murder and other 
criminal cases), that the Federal Bill of Rights applied to State 
legislation."98 Ultimately the persistence of legal counsel bore 
fruit. 
In 1925, in the case of Gitlow v. New York,"' 9 the Supreme 
Court wrote, for the first time, that "freedom of speech and of 
the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress- are among the fundamental 
personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the 
States."100 
This analysis was somewhat surprising, due to the fact 
that-only three years earlier-in Prudential Insurance v. 
Cheek, 101 the Court had asserted that "neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the 
United States imposes upon the states any restrictions about 
'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of silence'; nor, we may add, 
does it confer any right of pnvacy upon either persons or 
corporations." 10:l 
Following Gitlow, the Court developed a relatively 
consistent analytical scheme for incorporating various 
provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court initially queried whether a particular 
constitutional protection was "so rooted in the tradition and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."103 
By 1968, the analysis had become broader and more inclusive, 
with the Court asking whether a particular provision was 
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice."104 
As a result of these formulations, by 1971 the only 
provisions of the first eight amendments that had not been 
incorporated were the second and third amendments, the fifth 
amendment's requirement of grand jury indictment and the 
HARV. 1. REV. 431, 436 (1925-26). 
98. Id. 
99. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
100. Id. at 666. 
101. 259 U.S. 530 (1922) 
102. Id. at .543. 
103. Palko v. Connecticut, ::102 U.S. 319 (1937). 
104. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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seventh amendment's guarantee of jury trial in civil cases. 105 
Moreover, in a series of cases in the late 1960s, the Supreme 
Court established the principle that incorporated provisions of 
the Bill of Rights apply to the "states in precisely the same 
manner as they appl[y] to the federal government."106 Thus, if 
the exclusionary rule applies to the federal government, it 
applies to the states. 107 
At the same time that the Supreme Court was invoking 
the doctrine of selective incorporation, it was diminishing the 
role of the Tenth Amendment. Early cases had invoked the 
Amendment to invalidate congressional regulation of the 
"purely internal affairs" of the states. 108 Thus, in Hammer v. 
Dagenhare09 the Court struck down a child labor law because 
it intruded upon the "local power always existing and carefully 
reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. "110 
However, the formulations the Court used in these early 
Tenth Amendment cases were not, in all candor, terribly 
satisfying. They tended to turn upon rigid, hypertechnical 
definitions often far removed from reality. The decisions, 
moreover, often stood in the way of what was widely perceived 
as social or economic progress-as witnessed by the Court's 
invalidation of the child labor law in Dagenhart. 111 As a 
result, judicial enforcement of the Amendment underwent a 
rapid decline at the end of the 1930s. 
Although it was invoked in 1936 to justify the invalidation 
of federal legislation fixing maximum hours and minimum 
wages in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 112 the Tenth Amendment, 
five years later had been reduced, as noted by Justice Stone in 
United States v. Darby, 113 to nothing but a "truism."114 
Justice Stone noted that the amendment accurately described 
that the states retained all non-delegated powers-but that 
description exhausted the amendment's operative force; it 
105. GEOn'REY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7R4 (2d ed. 1991). 
106. ld. at 7Rfi (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
107. Mapp v. Ohio, :167 U.S. 64:1 (1961). 
108. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (191R). 
109. 247 U.S. at 251. 
110. Id. at 274. 
111. See id. at 251. 
112. 29R U.S. 2:18 (19a6). 
11a. a12 u.s. 100 (1941J. 
114. ld. at 124. 
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would not be (and, he inferred, could not be) judicially 
enforced. 115 
The Tenth remained a mere "truism" for nearly forty years 
following Darby. 116 In 1976, however, that Amendment 
was revitalized in National League of Cities u. Usery. 117 In 
that case Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, observed 
that '"While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 
"truism,"' . . . it is not without significance."118 The majority 
in Usery then proceeded to invalidate amendments to the Fair 
Labor Standards Act insofar as they "operate[d] to directly 
displace . . . States' freedom to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions .... "119 
The new substantive content of Tenth Amendment 
recognized in Usery was short lived. Eight years later, in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority/20 the 
Court, in a five to four decision, overruled Usery. The Garcia 
Court asserted that the traditional governmental function test 
enunciated in Usery was as unworkable as the Court's earlier 
Tenth Amendment cases. 121 Justice Blackmun then concluded 
that the states' active participation in the federal political 
process made judicial enforcement of federalism values 
unnecessary. According to Justice Blackmun's opinion, the only 
check on federal power contemplated by the Constitution was 
the one provided by the political process. 122 The Tenth 
Amendment was again reduced to nothing but a truism. 
One can question whether the incorporation doctrine and 
the devaluation of the Tenth Amendment have been unalloyed 
blessings. The decisions surveyed above have diminished the 
vigor with which state governments can compete within the 
federal power structure. Binding the states to every jot and 
tittle of the first eight amendments and reducing the Tenth 
Amendment to the status of a proverb has limited the ability of 
the states, in the words of Justice Powell, to "serve as an 
effective 'counterpoise' to the power of the Federal 
115. See id. 
116. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 169 (11th ed. 1985). 
117. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
118. !d. at R42-43 (quoting U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)). 
119. !d. at 852. 
120. 469 U.S. 528 (19R5). 
121. !d. at 546-47. 
122. !d. at 556. 
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Government."123 
As the Framers recognized, the federal structure of 
government preserves numerous advantages to the people. 124 
Although it may not be self-evident why states should retain 
substantial independent authority, there are identifiable 
advantages to a dual system of government. In "Democracy in 
America," Alexis de Tocqueville, asserted, 
[t]he strength of free nations resides in the local community. 
Local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to 
science; they bring it within people's reach, they teach people 
how to use and enjoy it. Without local institutions, a nation 
may establish a free government, but it cannot have the spirit 
of liberty. 12" 
Justice O'Connor in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 126 articulated other 
advantages of our federal structure. There, she stated that a 
dual system of government: 
assures a decentralized government that will be more 
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it 
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic 
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation 
in government; and it makes government more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry. 127 
Such values do not seem to be widely appreciated by many 
in the legal community. The casebook I use in my own 
constitutional law course asks the rhetorical question "Why 
study federalism?" at the outset of the chapter on the scope of 
congressional regulatory authority. 128 The answers that the 
authors give are: one, that the study of federalism is 
interesting for historical reasons and, two, that the study is 
useful for the perspective it can give on the various analytical 
tools the Court has developed over time. 129 Not mentioned, of 
course, is the possibility that federalism is a value not only 
123. ld. at ii71 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
124. SeP THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra note 29, at 221i (Alexander Hamilton); 
ld. No. 57, at 31i7-li8. 
121i. ALEXIS DE TOGQUEVILLE, D~;MUGRACY IN AMERICA 62-63 (J.P. Mayer ed., 
1969). 
126. 111 S.Ct. 2391i (1991). 
127. ld. at 2:199. 
128. STONE ET AL., ;;upra note 105, at 139. 
129. ld. at 1:39-40. 
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worthy of historical study and academic admiration, but also of 
promotion and preservation. 
Justice Louis Brandeis, writing nearly sixty years ago, 
argued that: 
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a 
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be 
fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country. 130 
The Supreme Court's incorporation doctrine and Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence may discourage useful state 
experimentation. Discouraging such experimentation, moreover, 
can have significant costs. An advisory commission on 
intergovernmental relations recently found that a substantial 
number of innovations had first been implemented at the state 
or local level, including sunset legislation, zero based 
budgeting, equal housing, no fault insurance, pregnancy 
benefits for working women, limited access highways, education 
for handicapped children, auto pollution standards, and energy 
assistance for the poor. 131 Federally mandated standards on 
every issue within the reach of the federal constitution can 
dampen not only the ardor-but the ability-of state and local 
governments to undertake such experiments in the future. 
Disregarding federalism concerns may interfere with 
federal experimentation as well. It is quite possible, for 
example, that the current Supreme Court's unwillingness to 
read various protections of the Bill of Rights broadly springs, in 
large part, from the fact that an expansive reading of those 
protections will bind all courts in the land. When its decisions 
have such a dramatic impact, the Court has an understandable 
and strong incentive to move cautiously (perhaps too 
cautiously) in new areas of the law-and perhaps even cut back 
on prior decisions that, for various reasons, may have arguably 
gone too far. Thus, although the incorporation doctrine has 
undeniably expanded personal liberties throughout the country 
on both the state and federal level, one can now wonder 
130. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1982). 
131. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Question of 
State Government Capability 23-24 (1985). 
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whether it is not-in fact-operating as something of a brake 
on further judicial explication of the Bill of Rights. 
There are indications that the Supreme Court will remain 
sensitive to federalism concerns. Despite the Court's 
application of the first eight amendments to the states 
(ostensibly in the exact same form as they apply to the federal 
government), the Court has not completely lost sight of 
federalism values. The Court, for example, has concluded that 
twelve-person juries are not indispensable to the right of trial 
by jury132 and has upheld the constitutionality of less than 
unanimous verdicts in some state criminal cases. 133 
There are also indications that the Tenth Amendment may 
have somewhat more force than Justice Blackmun's opinion in 
Garcia would indicate. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 134 decided 
earlier this year, Justice O'Connor articulated a "plain 
statement rule" to add substantive content to the "political 
process check" on congressional power enunciated in 
Garcia. 135 In essence, the Court put bite into that political 
process check by requiring Congress to make clear its intent to 
"'pre-empt the historic powers of the States."'136 
The Antifederalists pushed for a Bill of Rights primarily to 
preserve the independent sovereignty of the states. 137 In a 
rich historical irony they could not have anticipated, the Bill of 
Rights instead became the means by which much of the 
residual power retained by the states following the 
Constitutional Convention was ceded to the federal 
government. As a result, the structure of the nation has been 
undeniably altered, raising the question-recently noted by 
Justice O'Connor in Gregory v. Ashcroft-"whether our 
federalist system has been quite as successful in checking 
government abuse as [the Framers] promised."138 
Whatever the answer to that question, Justice Harlan's 
observation in Pointer v. Texas 139 is worth remembering: 
It is too often forgotten in these times that the American 
federal system is itself Constitutionally ordained, that it 
132. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
133. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
134. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991). 
13fi. !d. at 2401. 
1.36. !d. 
137. THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 12, at 98. 
138. GreJJury, 111 S. Ct. at 2400. 
1.39. ;iRO U.S. 400 (1965). 
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embodies values profoundly making for lasting liberties in this 
country, and that its legitimate requirements demand 
continuing solid recognition in all phases of the work this 
Court. 140 
IV. RESTRUCTURING SOCIETY: THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND 
MODERN AUTONOMY 
I would now like to turn to the final structural role I have 
identified for the Bill of Rights. That is, its modern role in 
structuring not merely governmental power, but society itself. 
As the Provost of this University, Bruce Hafen, recently noted, 
"it is easy for the contemporary mind to forget that the 
concepts embodied in the Bill of Rights were originally 
intended to define only the political relationship between 
individual citizens and the [Government]-not the domestic 
and personal relationships among the citizens themselves."141 
The modern Supreme Court, however, has assured that-at 
least for the foreseeable future-the Bill of Rights will be used 
not merely to structure governmental relationships, but to 
restructure social institutions. 142 
If one can believe what one reads in the newspapers and 
sees on television, the hottest constitutional topics of the day 
are whether the Bill of Rights includes a generalized right of 
privacy, and if so, whether the boundaries of that right are 
narrow or broad. This "right of privacy"-sometimes recast by 
individual Justices as a right of "autonomy"-lies at the heart 
of the third structural role of the Bill of Rights. I would 
therefore like to briefly discuss two issues: First, where does 
this asserted right of privacy come from? Second, what is the 
content of the right? 
It is relatively easy to pinpoint the Supreme Court decision 
that gave rise to the modern right of privacy. Although there 
are decisions from the 1920s 143 and the 1940s 144 that have 
now been recharacterized as privacy decisions, the font of 
modern privacy doctrine is quite clearly Griswold v. 
140. Id. at 409. 
141. Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning 
of Belonginfi, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 7. 
142. ld. at 4-7. 
148. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 26R U.S. fi10 (192fi); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 3RO (1928). 
144. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 816 U.S. 5:i5 (1942) 
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Connecticut. 145 It is not as easy, however, to pinpoint the 
exact constitutional basis for Griswold itself. 
The case involved a state law that prohibited the use of 
contraceptives by married couples. Justice Douglas' well-known 
plurality opinion concluded that the right of privacy was 
included within the emanations and shadows of the express 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. 146 Douglas adopted this 
approach to avoid criticism that the Court was merely engaged 
in the type of free-wheeling, substantive due process analysis 
exemplified by Lochner v. New York 147• 148 
Other Justices concurring in Griswold, however, feared 
that Douglas' approach was-if anything-more uncabined 
than Lochner. 149 As a result, they grounded their decision on 
the fact that the contraception law interfered with a personal 
right so obviously established and so universally accepted that 
it was undeniably fundamental. 150 This approach, of course, 
comes very near to establishing modern natural law, with the 
content of that natural law tied closely to tradition. 
The answer to the first question I have posed, therefore, is 
this: the modern right of privacy comes from Griswold, 
although we can't be quite certain of the precise constitutional 
niche for the result announced in that case.151 The uncertain 
categorization of the privacy right recognized in Griswold, in 
turn, renders the answer to the second question-what is the 
content of the privacy right?-even more difficult. But, it is the 
answer to this second question that is of surpassing 
importance. 
If you doubt the gravity of the second question, you must 
have been comatose for the past month. The recent 
interrogation of Clarence Thomas by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee seemed to suggest that the future of the nation 
depended upon his answer to the second question. Judge 
Thomas, of course, refused to give an answer, on the ground 
that it might influence his impartiality should a case involving 
that issue come before him. A more candid answer might have 
been that he-like everyone else-is not quite sure what the 
145. 381 U.S. 479 (196fi). 
146. ld. at 483-84. 
147. 198 U.S. 4.S (190fi). 
148. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 514-15. 
149. See Ld. at 486. 
1fi0. ld. at 485-86. 
1fil. ld. at 479. 
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privacy right entails. 
The possible content and reach of the modern right of 
privacy is exemplified by the differing opinions in Griswold 
itself. The rather free-wheeling analysis used by Justice 
Douglas has no obvious boundaries. 152 The approach of the 
other Justices in Griswold, by contrast, is closely tied to history 
and tradition. 153 The first approach would permit Justices to 
create rights they would thereafter deem fundamental; the 
second approach would restrict the right of privacy to rights 
that have been historically and traditionally recognized as 
fundamental. 
It is simply not clear which of the two approaches 
preponderates. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 154 a majority of the 
Supreme Court adhered closely to the second approach in 
concluding that private, homosexual behavior was not 
constitutionally protected. 155 Justice White, writing for the 
majority, noted that the Court "comes nearest to illegitimacy 
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little 
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the 
Constitution."156 Sensitive to this caution, the Court 
concluded that homosexual conduct was not entitled to 
heightened constitutional protection because, far from being 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in 
this Nation's history and tradition," homosexuality had long 
been rejected by Western culture as deviant behavior. 157 
Justice Blackmun, by contrast, took a much broader view 
of the privacy right. He concluded that history and tradition 
were irrelevant because the state prohibition of homosexual 
conduct intruded upon what he called "'the most comprehensive 
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 
'the right to be let alone."'158 According to Justice Blackmun, 
autonomy simpliciter-not history, tradition, or community 
values-determines the content of the privacy right. 159 
The divergent approaches to defining the content of the 
privacy right raise difficult questions for the future. As a 
152. See id. at 481-86. 
153. See id. at 486-fi07. 
154. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
155. Id. at 194. 
156. ld. 
1fi7. ld. at 191-92 (citations omitted). 
158. ld. at 199 (citations omitted). 
1fi9. ld. 
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matter of separation of powers, the uncertainty has the 
potential of shifting a vast reservoir of policymaking authority 
from the legislative arena into the judicial branch. The 
eagerness with which various groups, each promoting its 
cherished "right," have seized upon privacy theory to further 
their agendas is mute testimony to this fact. Hardwick itself is 
evidence that constitutional privacy litigation is undertaken 
more in the name of furthering a cause than protecting the 
rights of individual litigants; no actual prosecution was 
pending against Mr. Hardwick at the time he filed his suit. 160 
As Bruce Hafen has noted, "the case was not concerned with 
actually protecting Hardwick. Rather, the case was a forum for 
urging the Court to lead the way in shaping a new cultural 
consensus." 161 
The dispute regarding the content of the privacy right has 
troubling sociological overtones as well. The decision that a 
particular area lies within a zone of "privacy" or "autonomy" 
effectively shuts out all considerations beyond those deemed 
relevant by the individual himself. Thus, in the course of 
deciding in Roe v. Wade 164 that the right of privacy included 
the right to terminate a pregnancy, the Court essentially 
decreed that all considerations except the woman's own 
reproductive desires were irrelevant (at least until the unborn 
child could fend for itself). 163 As a result, society's 
traditionally cherished interest in protecting unborn life, as 
well as the long-recognized interests of all other individuals 
impacted by a pregnancy (including the biological father) were 
put beyond the pale. The decision, in short, decreed that the 
community had no right to further communal interests in an 
area intimately tied to the preservation of society 
itself-human reproduction. 164 
This is not the place to debate the merits of the Court's 
abortion jurisprudence. What Roe v. Wade and subsequent 
decisions evidence, however, is the potential of modern privacy 
doctrine to cut the individual off from the demands of society in 
ways that go well beyond the express provisions of the Bill of 
160. !d. 
161. Hafen, supra note 141, at 12. 
162. 410 U.S. 11:1 (197a). 
16:1. SPf' id. 
164. !d. 
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Rights. 165 The completely private individual-secure in a 
tight little autonomy bubble that bristles with enforceable, 
porcupine-like rights-comes to exist outside and independent 
of the community. Such an autonomous individual, moreover, is 
increasingly encouraged to shout, "I know my rights!" and to 
forget or minimize the responsibilities that society has, in the 
past, legitimately imposed. 
The extent to which privacy doctrine will effectively 
immunize the individual from social demands depends upon 
the approach the Court takes in explicating that doctrine. If 
the Court emphasizes the role of history and tradition, relied 
upon by the concurring opinions in Griswold, privacy doctrine 
will reinforce community values and thereby serve as a "link to 
the past rather than a slide into the future." 166 Should the 
Court follow the path blazed by Justice Blackmun, however, 
quite the contrary will occur. I, for one, am personally troubled 
by that possibility. 
It seems clear enough that the Framers of the Bill of 
Rights intended its provisions to free the individual from 
odious invasions of personal liberty by the government, and to 
secure the conditions under which a free society could best 
thrive. 167 Justice Blackmun's theory of autonomy, however, 
raises the possibility that the Bill of Rights can be pressed to 
the point where individuals-but not the community-may 
survive. Legal scholars and philosophers beyond my abilities 
have raised cautions regarding this issue. 168 For present 
purposes, and in conclusion, I simply wish to point out the 
obvious: in defining the precise content of the modern right of 
privacy, courts-and the entire legal profession-must keep an 
eye, not only on the individual, but on the community. For, in 
our eagerness to protect the golden egg, we may kill the goose 
that laid it. 
165. See Hafen, supra note 141, at 1. 
166. ld. at 23. 
167. See supra part II. 
16il. See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 141, at 1. 
